October called for urgent patching of PHP and GitLab, and for refreshing trust stores after the eMudhra incident. The PHP flaws entered the CISA KEV catalog five days after the fixes shipped, and Mozilla distrusted the eMudhra root three days after the report.
Updating is not the end of it. Alpine Linux updated its GitLab twice and was still vulnerable twice: first it installed the wrong version by mistake, then a patched version that did not work with its own Ruby. In that window an attacker brought the server processes down eight times. So alongside the list of fixes, we also write about how to confirm that a patch actually took effect.
Sources are listed at the end of the article. Where we rely on a secondary source, the sentence says so. As of November 2, 2026.
TL;DR - Key takeaways
- The month in one sentence
- What to do this week
- php2shell: two critical RCE flaws in the PHP core
- eMudhra: the private keys of eight intermediate CAs, recoverable from public certificates
The month in one sentence
A released fix is not the same as a patched system. Alpine Linux first installed the wrong GitLab version, then a patched one that did not work with its own Ruby, and in the meantime an attacker brought the server processes down eight times. A version number in your inventory does not yet mean the vulnerability is gone.
What to do this week
The list runs from the most urgent down. Details and sources are in the sections below.
- Update PHP on every server, in every container image and in appliances with PHP built in. Restart PHP-FPM or Apache.
- Update GitLab to the latest version in your branch. If it runs on your own Ruby, update Ruby too, then confirm that the fix is really active.
- Patch the edge devices in KEV: FortiMail, Ivanti Connect Secure, Citrix NetScaler, Cisco ASA/FTD, PAN-OS.
- Refresh trust stores:
ca-certificatespackages, container images, Go applications and anything else carrying its own store. - Refrigeration and building controllers: ask your service provider what is reachable from the internet, cut that access, and either update the firmware or plan replacement for devices out of support.
- WordPress with UpdraftPlus: update to 1.26.13 or 2.26.13 and review accounts holding
manage_options. - Nextcloud with the built-in Collabora server (CODE): update to 26.4.303 and check for indicators of compromise.
- If you use FELG Dent, Fakturownia or IQ Dental: change passwords and API keys, turn on 2FA, and verify any change of bank account number by phone.
- Review your logs against the indicators in sections 1, 3 and 6. If you find something, treat the system as compromised.
| Product | CVE | Safe version (minimum) | In KEV? |
|---|---|---|---|
| PHP | CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 | 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35 | Yes, since Oct 26 |
| GitLab CE/EE | CVE-2026-97229, CVE-2026-110264 | 19.5.1 / 19.4.3 / 19.3.6 / 19.2.9 / 19.1.9 / 19.0.10 / 18.11.13, plus Ruby 3.3.13 / 3.4.12 / 4.0.9 if you bring your own Ruby | 97229 yes, since Oct 29 |
| FortiMail | CVE-2026-104286 | 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.9. For 7.2, version 7.2.10 is announced; the 7.0 branch has to be migrated | Yes, since Oct 1 |
| Collabora Online (CODE) for Nextcloud | CVE-2026-110447 | 26.4.303 | Yes, since Oct 23 |
| UpdraftPlus (WordPress) | no CVE (stolen keys) | 1.26.13 / 2.26.13 | Not applicable |
| Ivanti Connect Secure | CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357, CVE-2026-118527 | per the vendor advisories | Yes, Oct 13 and Oct 30 |
| Trust stores (eMudhra) | no CVE | current ca-certificates; Go 1.27.3 / 1.26.10 or newer | Not applicable |
| Danfoss AK-SM 800A | CVE-2025-41450, CVE-2025-41451, CVE-2025-41452 (link to the attacks unconfirmed) | R4.2 and R4.3.1. AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 are out of support: replace them or cut them off from the internet | No (catalog of Oct 30) |
| Copeland/Dixell XWEB | no confirmed CVE for the attacks | no version number in the sources; CERT-FR points to the document "Recommandations pour une utilisation sécurisée des superviseurs XWEB v1.0" | No (catalog of Oct 30) |
1. php2shell: two critical RCE flaws in the PHP core
On Apache with mod_php, a single unauthenticated HTTP request is enough, before a line of application code runs.
On October 20 the PHP security team announced releases for October 21. Versions 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 remove two critical vulnerabilities that their finders named "php2shell".
CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w) is remote code execution through memory corruption at the moment memory runs out. PHP aborts a request once it exceeds memory_limit. If that happens while the request's internal structures are only partly initialised, for example while an upload is being parsed, the cleanup routine treats them as valid.
CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp) is remote code execution through stale global state. State from one request can survive the memory being freed, after a fatal error for instance, and the next request in the same worker process uses it before it is reset. A classic use-after-free.
Scores. CVSS 4.0 gives both flaws 9.2. On the CVSS 3.1 scale, NVD lists 9.8 for CVE-2026-109618 and 8.1 for CVE-2026-109619. When comparing these against other flaws, watch which CVSS version you are reading.
Exploits. According to the PHP Foundation, no working exploit was known at release time. Three things sped the work up: the CVE identifiers leaking on October 20 with an incorrect 10.0 score, a video published by the company Calif by accident, and Chainguard breaking the embargo on October 21 at 07:41 UTC. By October 21 CERT-EU was already writing about the first proofs of concept in the wild. Five days later CISA added both flaws to the KEV catalog.
On October 23 the PHP team disclosed a third flaw, CVE-2026-115560. According to CERT-EU it affects only unusually configured applications, and the fix will ship in the normal release cycle. Until then the advice is to set session.upload_progress.enabled=0.
Who is affected. Every PHP installation serving web requests: Apache with mod_php, PHP-FPM, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. Vulnerable are 8.5 before 8.5.12, 8.4 before 8.4.27, 8.3 before 8.3.36, 8.2 before 8.2.35, and branches out of support. CERT Polska writes that every version from 5.4 onward is affected, and reminds readers about systems built on PHP such as WordPress, Joomla and WooCommerce. Remember appliances and container images too, where PHP is one component among many.
Attack vector. A crafted HTTP request that triggers an out-of-memory condition or a fatal error at the right moment. On Apache with mod_php a single unauthenticated request is enough. On PHP-FPM, exploitation depends on the code paths in the particular application.
- Update PHP to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35. Check the packages from your distribution or your LTS support vendor as well.
- For PHP 8.1 and older, use your distribution's backport or move to a supported version. The PHP team published minimal source patches for 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1.
- Take inventory. CERT-EU recommends the list of software with PHP bundled in, maintained by NCSC-NL in the
php2shellrepository on GitHub. Rebuild and redeploy container images. - If you cannot update right away, set
post_max_sizeto 8M, or 32M where you accept file uploads, andupload_max_filesizebelow that. - Use
memory_limit=-1only together with a memory limit at the container or cgroup level, preferably one that kills a single worker process. Do not useRLIMIT_ASorRLIMIT_DATA, because they trigger the vulnerable path. - Set
max_input_varsto 1000 or lower,session.upload_progress.enabled=0, and on PHP 8.5 alsofatal_error_backtraces=0. - Enforce these settings at the server level, through
php_admin_valuein the FPM pool or in the Apache configuration, so the application cannot override them withini_set()or.user.ini. Then restart every worker process. - Monitor PHP processes that spawn a shell or download tooling. CISA published a SIGMA rule for this.
Workarounds are not a substitute for updating
Workarounds close only the known attack paths. PHP, CERT Polska and CERT-EU agree that updating is the only full protection. CISA advises disconnecting PHP systems that cannot be patched quickly, including those on PHP 8.1 and older, until they are updated. In our tests, what usually gets left behind is not the server everyone remembers, but an old container and an appliance with PHP inside that nobody has SSH access to. After updating, check the version in every running process. A package manager shows you only what was installed.
2. eMudhra: the private keys of eight intermediate CAs, recoverable from public certificates
The private keys of eight certificate authorities were numbers below 256. A Mozilla engineer recovered them trivially, and local AI agents did it on the first try.
On October 17 an independent researcher reported to Mozilla, Google, Apple, Microsoft and eMudhra that the private keys of eight intermediate certificate authorities belonging to the Indian CA eMudhra, operating under the emSign brand, could be computed from their public certificates. The report included proof of control over each key.
Six of the intermediates issue TLS certificates and two sign code. Each also had a cross-certificate from Sectigo, which makes 16 certificates in total. The curve was NIST P-384, and the private keys were the numbers 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237, so at most 8 bits of entropy instead of roughly 384.
The keys were generated during a ceremony on April 30, 2025, on HSM modules certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3. According to eMudhra, the wrap/unwrap step created a second, weak set alongside the strong keys, and that second set went into the certificates. The error survived around 18 months and two audits. Mozilla pointed out that back in June 2025 another report had described CRLs from the same six intermediates carrying invalid signatures. According to eMudhra, none of the eight authorities issued an end-entity certificate.
How the ecosystem responded. Between October 17 and 19 Mozilla blocked the intermediates through OneCRL, eMudhra revoked them, and Sectigo revoked the cross-certificates. On October 20 Mozilla issued an emergency distrust of the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root, noting that it was not distrusting emSign Root CA - G1 for now. Microsoft blocked the intermediates through the Disallowed list and through CRLSet in Edge. On October 22 eMudhra announced its exit from the global SSL/TLS certificate market. Late in the month Microsoft removed seven certificates from the Windows and Edge stores.
According to eMudhra, roughly 30,800 certificates issued in the G3 hierarchies belong to a single customer ecosystem in the United States. There is no confirmation that the keys were used in attacks, but Mozilla noted that many people recovered them independently and that some published them online.
Who is affected. Not only eMudhra customers. CERT Polska stresses that any organisation whose software trusts these authorities is at risk. Browsers are already protected. The risk stays where stores are updated rarely and revocation status is not checked: containers, application runtimes, IoT, VPN clients, offline machines and developer tooling. Kudelski points out that the curl built into macOS does not check revocation, and that Go applications built with a version older than 1.27.3 or 1.26.10 have to be rebuilt.
Attack vector. Recover the private key from the public certificate and issue a forged TLS certificate for any domain. To intercept traffic the attacker needs a position in the middle: a hostile Wi-Fi network, a compromised router, control over a carrier's network. The code-signing keys allow malware to be signed so that it passes rules admitting only signed programs.
- Update operating systems, browsers and
ca-certificatespackages, including on offline machines. - Rebuild and redeploy container images and applications carrying their own certificate store: Java, Python, Go, Node.js, agents and VPN clients.
- Check that your applications reject chains leading to AAA Certificate Services through cross-certificates. CERT Polska warns that removing the eMudhra root alone may not be enough.
- Review mTLS trust stores, CA certificates loaded into proxies, WAFs and load balancers, and origin certificates in your CDN.
- If you hold certificates from eMudhra, plan to replace them, because the company is leaving the TLS market.
- Review AppLocker, WDAC and EDR rules that admit software based on the certificate issuer.
- Do not turn off certificate validation "just for a moment". CERT Polska notes that a test result in a browser says nothing about the rest of your software.
An HSM and two audits did not stop a flaw in the procedure
FIPS-certified hardware does not protect against a flaw in the procedure around it. Check when anyone last verified how your organisation generates, and where it stores, the keys for PKI and code signing, along with application secrets. On engagements like this we ask directly for the list of applications with their own trust store, because it is almost never available on the spot, and that list is what decides the scope of the work.
3. GitLab: two RCE flaws rated CVSS 10.0 in nine days
Alpine Linux updated GitLab twice and was still vulnerable twice. A version number is not enough to call a system patched.
On October 12 GitLab released 19.4.2, 19.3.5 and 19.2.8 with a fix for CVE-2026-97229. It is a flaw in the regular expression compiler used in CI/CD configuration, inside the Onigmo engine built into Ruby. According to GitLab it lets an unauthenticated user execute arbitrary code on the server, and the CVSS 3.1 score is 10.0. The flaw bypasses the incomplete fix in 19.4.1 from September 23, so 19.4.1 is not safe.
What happened at Alpine Linux. On October 13 Alpine updated GitLab to 19.3.4 instead of 19.3.5 by mistake, that is, to a version without the fix. Between October 20 and 21 a newly registered account submitted crafted CI configurations: GitLab worker processes went down eight times, and in four cases the exploit got part of the way. The attacker also pulled the GitLab container image Alpine uses, which suggests they were tuning the exploit.
On October 22 the update to 19.3.6 did not remove the flaw, because the fix was a patch to Ruby that GitLab ships only with its official packages, while the Alpine image used stock Ruby. A day later the Ruby team released fixes in 3.3.13, 3.4.12 and 4.0.9. At the end of the month Alpine rebuilt the instance from scratch, reset every password and rotated the GitLab secrets.
Alpine found no evidence of code execution but could not rule it out. Repositories, packages and releases were not modified, and the signing keys were never kept on the GitLab server. On October 29 CISA added CVE-2026-97229 to the KEV catalog.
On October 21 GitLab released further versions fixing CVE-2026-110264. This is another flaw in the regular expression compiler, also rated CVSS 10.0 and also requiring no authentication. It affects every version from 7.0 onward, which is why the fix reached older branches too. For completeness: in September another GitLab flaw entered KEV, a path traversal in the commits API, CVE-2026-85706. If your instance has not been updated since August, that one applies to you as well.
Who is affected. Self-managed GitLab CE and EE installations. GitLab.com and GitLab Dedicated are already patched. Most exposed are source installs and custom images running system Ruby, and internet-facing instances with open registration.
Attack vector. A malicious regular expression in CI/CD configuration processed by the server, among other paths through the ciLint GraphQL mutation used by the pipeline editor. In Alpine's case an ordinary, freshly created account was enough.
- Update GitLab to at least 19.5.1, 19.4.3, 19.3.6, 19.2.9, 19.1.9, 19.0.10 or 18.11.13. That update removes both October RCE flaws.
- If GitLab runs on your own Ruby, which is the case for source installs and custom images, update Ruby to 3.3.13, 3.4.12, 4.0.9 or newer.
- Turn off open registration and restrict internet access to the instance through a VPN or an allowlist.
- Deploy the detection rules GitLab published, based on
graphql_json.log, and review your logs for worker crashes since October 12. - If you see traces of attempts, treat the instance as compromised. Rotate CI/CD variables, runner tokens, access tokens, deploy keys and secrets in repositories, then verify the integrity of artifacts and pipelines.
A version number is not proof
Alpine had the right version number and was still vulnerable, because the fix shipped in the Ruby that GitLab relies on. After a critical update, check the versions of the components, Ruby in this case, and ideally retest the vulnerability. We treat a retest after patching as a separate stage of an engagement, because it happens that a fix lands on only some instances, or misses the image used in CI.
4. Supermarket refrigeration: remote defrosting across hundreds of stores
Refrigeration controllers reset remotely pushed in-store temperatures to around 50°C, and France's finance minister spoke of roughly 700 affected supermarkets. According to Danfoss, most of the devices were older models no longer receiving security updates.
The night of October 11 to 12. Someone took remote control of the controllers managing refrigeration systems in stores across France. According to Reuters, refrigeration control panels are usually reachable over the internet so that service companies can configure them remotely. Danfoss says the attack involved its controllers.
The damage. The attackers forced continuous defrosting. In one chain temperatures reached around 50°C and, according to SecurityWeek and the BBC citing Reuters, stayed there for about six hours in Intermarché stores, after which all the food was thrown out. According to Le Monde, cited by SecurityWeek, the attackers also stretched defrost cycles from one hour to as much as eight, which delayed the alarms. The Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation and said the attack also caused fires.
The scale. According to France's finance minister, roughly 700 of about 10,000 supermarkets were hit, while earlier reports spoke of 300 to 350. The chains that confirmed losses are, according to SecurityWeek, Carrefour, Coopérative U, E.Leclerc, Intermarché and Monoprix. The CEO of Intermarché told BFM TV, via Reuters, of losses in the tens of millions of euros in a single day nationwide. Nobody claimed the attack and no ransom demand was reported. On October 13 CERT-FR extended its alert to Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb controllers.
The second wave, November 2. Overnight from November 1 to 2, chains in further countries reported similar problems. According to BleepingComputer, more than 115 stores were affected in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland and Estonia. The Guardian and Euronews write about seven countries, adding Finland. The head of Sabcobel, the refrigeration installer for the Delhaize chain, told Belgian media that the same mechanism was used as in France, but that is the service company speaking and investigators have not confirmed it.
Do we know the vulnerability? There is no official confirmation, because CERT-FR does not name a specific flaw, and neither Danfoss nor the French authorities have tied the attack to vulnerabilities described earlier by researchers. What is known is that on August 9, 2026, Claroty Team82 described flaws in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A: a hidden authentication mechanism derived from the device date (CVE-2025-41450), command injection leading to RCE (CVE-2025-41451) and Nginx configuration injection (CVE-2025-41452). Sekurak suggested these may be the flaws in question, but there is no official confirmation. We treat it as a hypothesis. According to Censys, as of October 11 almost 3,000 Danfoss StoreView panels were visible on the internet, more than 1,800 of them in France.
Who is affected. Companies with refrigeration controllers reachable from the internet, usually for an external service provider. The second wave also hit small shops and butcheries in the Netherlands and an Ikea store in Mons. On Poland: according to Sekoia, cited by Reuters, stores in Poland were also affected, but no details were given. We found no CERT Polska advisory and no confirmation from a Polish retail chain, so we treat it as unconfirmed. Sekurak pointed out that exposed controllers are present in Poland as well.
- Inventory the refrigeration, air conditioning and other building controllers reachable from the internet. Ask your service company what is exposed and through which channel.
- Cut direct internet access and restore it only through a secured VPN or a protected network. CERT-FR allows IP filtering for service technicians at the firewall as a stopgap only. Before cutting off remote reporting, check the terms of your insurance policy.
- Update the firmware. For the Danfoss AK-SM 800A that means R4.3.1 or newer. For Danfoss, CERT-FR recommends the "Strict" security level and changing default passwords.
- Devices withdrawn from updates, such as the AK-SM800 and AK-SC355, cannot be patched. CERT-FR writes that leaving such a device on the internet means a very high probability of compromise, and that a factory reset is not enough. Plan replacement.
- Review the configuration, including defrost time windows, and if you suspect compromise, restart or restore the device and configure it from scratch.
- Put independent temperature measurement with alarming outside the controller, for example HACCP loggers with their own notification channel, so that a change of settings in the controller cannot hide the problem. This advice is not in the cited sources; we are adding it ourselves.
Old devices, internet access and an outside service provider
Refrigerators are only the example here. Devices controlling a physical process were reachable from the internet, and some of them had weaknesses known for months or no longer received fixes. According to SentinelOne, cited by the Guardian, retail chains run large fleets of refrigeration controllers, building management systems, access control panels and point-of-sale terminals. An external infrastructure test shows which of these are visible from the internet. In those tests we find building control panels regularly, and they are usually missing from the client's inventory, because an external service company put them there.
5. Poland: breaches at software vendors, and beyond
Three of the four incidents described here happened at software vendors, companies that process data on behalf of many customers at once.
CERT Polska's monthly report for October was not yet at its expected address when we closed this text, so we give no incident counts. We will come back to them in the November edition. When comparing, keep in mind that the incident classification changed on April 3, 2026, so data from April onward may not be fully comparable with what came before.
October brought further incidents at Polish companies to light, and new information about earlier ones. According to "Rzeczpospolita", the series began with the attack on the MyDr platform disclosed in August 2026. That falls outside the period of this roundup, so we mention it only as background. We describe the facts the companies stated and keep them separate from what the attackers claim.
FELG Software (FELG Dent): a claimed cross-tenant authorisation flaw. On October 1 Niebezpiecznik described an incident at a company building software for dental practices. A group calling itself "Horus" claims to have taken the data of 2.4 million patients, 1.2 million prescriptions and appointment records. Those figures come from the attackers alone, and after contact with Sekurak they themselves lowered the claimed number of staff accounts from 712,000 to 28,000. FELG Software confirmed the incident and an extortion attempt, and states that the stolen database amounts to around 10% of the data. The company's CEO told Sekurak the incident may have covered around 2 million patient records, noting that a record count does not have to match a number of people. The attackers name IDOR as the vector, that is, enumerating patient identifiers in the API across tenants. The company has not disclosed the vector.
Fakturownia: a claimed attack through response timing, the Rails key and RCE. According to Fakturownia's statement, an unauthorised person had access to its systems from September 27 to September 28 and copied a large part of the database. The incident concerns every account, though the range of data depends on the record date. Company and user data, password hashes, API tokens, integration keys, bank account numbers and data on business partners and invoices were taken. For around 2,250 accounts all data from 2022 to 2026 was taken, and KSeF certificates were not. The attacker told Zaufana Trzecia Strona that they extracted the Ruby on Rails master key using a timing oracle, that is, by reading it off differences in the server's response times, then forged a session cookie and obtained remote code execution. The editors suspect this was time-based blind SQL injection. Cyberscope also calls the chain a hypothesis. Fakturownia has not confirmed this interpretation. For customers, the biggest risk right now is convincing bank-account-change fraud, because the criminals may know the amounts, the business partners and the unpaid invoices.
IQ Dental: unauthorised access to an administrative account. According to IQ Dental's message to customers, cited by Niebezpiecznik, on October 1 someone gained unauthorised access to an administrative account in the system and then generated API access for queries about selected clinics. The incident was detected on October 5. Names, PESEL numbers, addresses and appointment data including notes may have been obtained. The company did not say how access to the account was gained. A board representative told Niebezpiecznik that the incident concerns 36 facilities and that the company recorded no extortion attempts.
Wakacje.pl: access to corporate mailboxes. Wakacje.pl sells holidays, so it stands apart from the three previous examples. The incident still affected many customers at once. According to a PAP dispatch of October 3, the service reported unauthorised access to some corporate mailboxes and to its customer service system. Contact details, addresses, dates of birth and passport data may have leaked. The company stresses that this data does not allow logging in to the customer panel, and that the incident did not involve payment systems. It advises placing a block on the PESEL number and considering a block on the passport.
What these incidents have in common. The attackers' claims and what the companies themselves disclosed point to classes of flaw that usually surface in an application and API test: cross-tenant authorisation flaws, leaked application secrets, an administrator account able to create API keys, and access to email mailboxes. None of the companies publicly confirmed the full vector. We write more about testing for these in How to secure an API and IDOR in CVAT, and about attacks on healthcare providers in Ransomware in the medical sector.
- If you build SaaS: test cross-tenant authorisation on every endpoint taking an object identifier, along with your database queries and secret handling. The Rails master key and similar secrets must not be reachable from the database, and they have to be rotated after an incident. Enforce MFA on administrative accounts and alert on new API keys and unusual data exports.
- If you use such SaaS: change passwords, generate new API keys and turn on 2FA. Confirm every change of a partner's bank account number by phone on a number you already knew, and check it against the VAT taxpayer whitelist.
- As a data controller: you have 72 hours to report a breach to the supervisory authority from the moment you become aware of it, including when the leak happened at a processor. Check which vendors you entrust data to and when anyone last assessed their security.
Cross-tenant authorisation needs its own tests
In a multi-tenant application we check every endpoint that takes an object identifier from two accounts belonging to different tenants. Flaws of this class are rarely visible in the code of a single controller, because the condition is usually there, it just checks the wrong thing. We look separately at administrative accounts and at what can be generated from them, because an API token created from a compromised account keeps working after the password is changed.
6. Vulnerabilities to patch: other notable KEV entries
In October CISA added 36 vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog, an average of more than one a day.
FortiMail (CVE-2026-104286), in KEV since Oct 1. A path traversal lets an unauthenticated attacker write arbitrary files to the appliance, and Fortinet rates it 9.8 on the CVSS 3.1 scale. The fixed versions are 8.0.2, 7.6.7 and 7.4.9. For 7.2, version 7.2.10 is announced, and CERT Polska recommends migrating to 7.4 or newer. The entire 7.0 branch is vulnerable. The vector is the IBE feature and the webmail interface. If you cannot update, disable IBE, cut webmail off from the internet, or block POST /ibe requests containing ../ at the WAF, and check your logs for the addresses 79.141.169.187 and 45.129.0.192.
Collabora Online for Nextcloud (CVE-2026-110447), in KEV since Oct 23. A flaw in the richdocumentscode app lets an unauthenticated attacker run commands with web server privileges while the local CODE server is momentarily down. According to NVD it had been exploited since September, and according to CERT Polska in ransomware attacks. The fix is in 26.4.303, and disabling the app in Nextcloud does not remove the vulnerability. Check the apps/richdocumentscode directory for shx*.php files and your logs for proxy.php?status requests carrying %2e%2e, $( or ${IFS}.
Selected October KEV entries: Oct 1 FortiMail (CVE-2026-104286), Oct 4 Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2026-88779), Oct 13 Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2026-104935), Oct 14 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS (CVE-2026-0322) and Cisco Secure Email Gateway (CVE-2026-76519), Oct 23 Collabora Online (CVE-2026-110447), Oct 26 PHP (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), Oct 27 Adobe Commerce and Magento (CVE-2026-48356), Oct 28 Broadcom VMware ESX (CVE-2026-41709) and the Linux kernel (CVE-2026-46300), Oct 29 GitLab CE/EE (CVE-2026-97229) and Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and FTD (CVE-2026-76418), Oct 30 Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527). If you run these products at the network edge, start there. The refrigeration controllers from section 4 are not in the KEV catalog.
Stolen UpdraftCentral keys: backdoors in WordPress. On October 18 and 19 an attacker holding genuine UpdraftCentral private keys installed backdoors on sites running UpdraftPlus, a plugin with more than 4 million installations. Patchstack stresses that this is not a flaw in the plugin's code: the commands were correctly signed, and the keys most likely leaked from the UpdraftCentral Cloud environment. The backdoor created an account that looked like an Editor but carried manage_options and install_plugins. CERT Polska recommends updating to UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 or 2.26.13, which invalidate the exposed keys. Removing the site from the UpdraftCentral panel is not enough on its own. Look for accounts with the display name "Site Tools", plugins described as "Small maintenance toolkit: keeps option storage tidy.", including in mu-plugins, and Command received: plugin.upload_plugin entries in the logs. Search for the account by its capabilities in the wp_usermeta table. The attacker sets the display name to whatever they like. If you were compromised, restore the site from a backup predating October 17.
Fortinet: the patch bundle of October 22. CERT Polska reported fixes for FortiOS, FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer, FortiMail and FortiAuthenticator that remove critical vulnerabilities among others. The vendor is to publish the details on November 10. Update the appliances right away, starting with those reachable from the internet. We will return to this in the November roundup.
Phishing against business banking customers. CERT Polska warned twice, on October 25 and 26, about a campaign impersonating banks. The pretexts were new transfer authorisation rules and an update of company documentation, and the goal was banking credentials. Combined with leaked invoicing data, that is a ready-made attack scenario against a finance department.
Where to start when there are more patches than hours
The order we suggest to clients: first what is in the KEV catalog and exposed to the internet at the same time, then the rest of the network edge, and internal systems last. For every item we look at what the service itself answers. A management console can show the version from the image while the running process has an entirely different one.
What this means for your company
Seven takeaways from this month.
- Start with an inventory. With php2shell and eMudhra, the hard part was not the patching but working out where PHP actually lives and which applications carry their own certificate store. With the supermarket refrigeration, the same goes for OT and IoT devices that an external service company can reach.
- Patch critical edge flaws within days. Eight days passed between the GitLab fix and the attack on Alpine. Five days passed between the PHP releases and the KEV entry.
- Check that the fix worked. Alpine first installed the wrong version, then a version that did not patch its environment. Verify dependencies, and retest after critical updates.
- Containers and offline systems are the blind spot. Images have to be rebuilt to pick up a new PHP, Ruby or
ca-certificates. - Your data is as safe as your weakest vendor. An incident at a software vendor hits its customers and their business partners. Assess your vendors and have a procedure ready for a breach at a processor.
- Test authorisation and the protection of administrative accounts. The vectors claimed in October are ordinary application flaws.
- NIS2 and the Polish KSC act stopped being theory. The amended KSC act took effect on April 3, 2026. Entities meeting the criteria on that date had until October 3, 2026 to apply for entry in the register, and have until April 3, 2027 to implement the statutory obligations, incident management among them. This month's incidents make good scenarios for checking whether your process works in practice. We write more in NIS2 in practice.
Got a topic for the November edition?
We build these roundups from what actually had to be patched in a given month. If something came up at your end and is worth writing about, email contact@pwnone.com with "monthly roundup" in the subject line.
Summary
October 2026 closed with two critical RCE flaws in the PHP core, which entered the CISA KEV catalog five days after the fixes shipped, the compromise of the private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities, and two GitLab flaws rated CVSS 10.0 within nine days. On top of that came remotely hijacked refrigeration controllers in hundreds of European stores and a series of breaches at Polish software vendors. The Alpine Linux case shows that updating and being patched are not the same thing: the version number matched, while the fix sat in a dependency nobody had replaced.
Frequently asked questions
Is updating PHP through my package manager enough?
On servers running PHP from the distribution repository, usually yes, provided the distribution has released fixed packages. After updating, restart PHP-FPM or Apache. Check container images, appliances and software with PHP bundled in separately. On PHP 8.1 and older you need a backport or a migration to a supported version.
We don't use eMudhra. Does the incident concern us?
It may. CERT Polska stresses that organisations whose software trusts these authorities are at risk, including those that are not eMudhra customers. The risk applies above all to containers, applications with their own certificate store, IoT devices, VPN clients and offline machines, that is, places where trust stores are updated rarely.
We updated GitLab in mid-October. Is that enough?
Probably not. On October 21 versions shipped with a fix for CVE-2026-110264, rated CVSS 10.0, and with your own Ruby you also need Ruby 3.3.13, 3.4.12 or 4.0.9. The full list of safe versions is in the table at the start of the article and in the GitLab section.
We run FortiMail 7.2 or 7.0. Can it be patched?
For the 7.2 branch, version 7.2.10 has been announced, and the 7.0 branch has to be migrated to 7.4 or newer. Until then, disable the IBE feature and cut webmail off from the internet, and block POST requests to /ibe containing a directory traversal sequence at the WAF.
Do these attacks also affect smart fridges and home appliances?
Based on the available sources, no. The incidents described concern controllers for commercial refrigeration installations in stores. They do not cover home appliances. We found no credible reports of a mass attack on home appliances in October 2026. The principles are similar, though: keep IoT devices on a separate network, update them, and do not expose them to the internet without a reason.
Our vendor asks us not to report the breach until they confirm it affects us. Can we wait?
Assessing the risk and reporting within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach is the data controller's duty, which means yours, even when the leak happened at a vendor. Document when you learned what, and take the decision with your data protection officer or a lawyer. If you do not have all the details yet, Article 33(4) of the GDPR allows you to report a breach and supply information in phases.
Bibliography
The PHP Foundation, October 21, 2026. A description of both php2shell flaws, the list of fixed versions and the timeline of the pre-release information leak. Accessed: November 2, 2026
CERT Polska, advisory 196/2026, October 21, 2026 (in Polish). The range of vulnerable versions and guidance for Polish administrators. Accessed: November 2, 2026
CERT-EU, Security Advisory 2026-018, v1.2 of October 23, 2026. The source for the PHP configuration workarounds and for the third flaw. Accessed: November 2, 2026
Mozilla Bugzilla. The researcher's report, the values of the weak keys and the timeline of Mozilla's response. Accessed: November 2, 2026
CERT Polska, advisory 199/2026, October 22, 2026 (in Polish). Who is affected beyond browsers, and what to do with trust stores. Accessed: November 2, 2026
GitLab, October 21, 2026. The full list of safe versions and the description of CVE-2026-110264. Accessed: November 2, 2026
Alpine Linux, October 28, 2026, updated October 30, 2026. The timeline of two ineffective updates and the scope of the instance rebuild. Accessed: November 2, 2026
CISA, catalog version 2026.10.30. 36 entries dated October 2026, counted by us; we also verified the absence of Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell entries. Accessed: November 2, 2026
CERT-FR (ANSSI), first version October 12, 2026, latest October 16, 2026 (in French). The list of affected controllers and the guidance on cutting internet access. Accessed: November 2, 2026
Claroty Team82, August 9, 2026. A description of three vulnerabilities in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A and of the fixed versions. A link to the October attacks has not been confirmed. Accessed: November 2, 2026

